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liability on the part of the one employing him, unless it was done
with some degree of fraud or malice.
The general Louisiana rule announced by Chief Justice
O'Niell in the principal case, read in the light of its established
exceptions, is an equitable disposition of the conflict of interests
presented when the court is called upon to consider the interest
of one individual in the security of transactions and, at the same
time, the interest of another individual in the right to free competition. Summed up, our present rule can be stated as follows:
One who is not a party to a contract is not liable in damages to
one of the parties to the contract for inducing the other party to
breach the contract, except when unlawful force or some definite
degree of fraud or malice is present.
W. F. M. M., JR.

MINERAL RIGHTS-GRAVEL NOT INCLUDED IN MINERAL RESERVA-

act of sale the
defendant acquired from the plaintiffs the land in question subject to a reservation in the deed in favor of the plaintiff-vendor
of nine-twentieths of all "the mineral, oil and gas rights." Commercial deposits of gravel were found on the tract and the plaintiffs seek to recover their share alleging that gravel was included
in the mineral reservation. Held, the parties in drawing up the
deed did not intend to reserve the gravel deposits in the deed.
Holloway Gravel Company, Incorporatedv. McKowen, 9 So. (2d)
228 (La. 1942).
The court in the instant case was eminently correct in the
application of the intention of the parties theory,' since the question as to whether or not gravel is a mineral 2 is a difficult, if not
TION-INTENTION OF PARTIES TEST APPLIED-By an

1. Although the Louisiana court has never been called upon to decide
whether or not sand and gravel are included in the general term "mineral
rights," a few indications of their instinctive reaction to the meaning of the
term are listed. In the case of Logan v. State Gravel Co., 158 La. 105, 110,
103 So. 526, 528 (1925), in which a contract to remove gravel was held to be

a lease, the court said, "We have an example of a lease of lands for mining
(or quarrying) purposes ... ," thus indicating that in the minds of the justices
there is a distinct difference between mining and quarrying. In the case
of Gonzales v. Watson, 162 La. 1048, 1053, 111 So. 416, 418 (1927) the court,

in speaking of the legislature's idea in defining a real estate broker, said "It
[the legislature]

did not have in

contemplation gravel or mineral leases."

Here the court signifies by the use of the disjunctive "or" that gravel and
minerals fall into definitely separate categories. Article 552 of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1870 uses both the term "mines" and the term "quarries."
2. It is interesting to note that the federal income tax law has included
gravel in the broad term "minerals" dealing with the deductions from the
gross income by means of depletion. C.C.H. 1942 Fed. Tax. Serv. 1923 (m-d).
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impossible, problem to answer accurately. The dictionary definition of minerals can throw little light on its signification in a
given case;3 the technical definition advanced by geologists has
also presented equally confusing issues.' In most of the cases in
the other jurisdictions 5 where the court has been called on to
determine whether or not gravel is a mineral the courts have held
that the term did not include gravel. 6 One court reaching such
conclusion reasoned that there can be no uniformity in the chemical content of gravel deposits for the reason that this depends entirely upon the character of the mineral deposits which have contributed to their formation. 7 However, the better reasoned opinions employ the approach used in the instant case and avoid the
3. Mineral-any chemical element or compound occurring naturally as a
product of inorganic processes. Anything which is neither animal nor vegetable, as in the old general classification of things into three kingdoms
(animal, vegetable and mineral). Webster's New International Dictionary,
Second Edition unabridged (1936) 1563. Any valuable inert or lifeless substance formed or deposited in its present position through natural agencies
alone and found either in or upon the soil of the earth or In the rocks beneath the soil. Black's Law Dictionary (3 ed. 1933) 1188. Any inorganic
substance found in nature, having sulficient value separated from its situs
as part of the earth to be mined, quarried, or dug, for its own sake or its
own specified uses. Ballentine's Law Dictionary (1930) 818.
4. Mineral-any form of earth, rock or metal of greater value while
in place than the enclosing country or the superficial soil. Morrison's Mining
Rights on the Public Domain (1910) 240. The word "minerals" in its widest
acceptation comprises every inorganic substance forming part of the crust or
solid body of the earth other than the layer of soil which sustains vegetable
life and other than the subsoil; and the minerals may be surface minerals
(such as gravel and clay) or minerals buried more or less deep in the subsoil. Lindley, Mines (3 ed. 1914) 90. The Report of the Commission to Draft
Oil, Gas and Mineral Code of 1938, which proposed code was never adopted
by the legislature, defined the term minerals as follows: "Art. 15. Whenever
the term mineral occurs in this Code or is used in any contract, it shall be
understood as including oil, gas and other hydro-carbons, whether in liquid
or gaseous form, unless the contrary be expressed or necessarily implied;
those substances though fugacious by nature and of peculiar character, being
recognized as minerals by the law of Louisiana."
5. The old maxim that definitions are always dangerous because it is
always difficult to prevent their being or becoming inaccurate, finds ample
justification when the attempt is made to define the words and phrases of a
more or less technical character in the mining contracts.
6. See the cases compiled in the following authorities: Lindley, Mines
(3 ed. 1914) 155, § 93: "It is to be observed that the clause 'and other minerals,' or 'all other minerals,' or 'other volatile substances,' as contained in
the ordinary lease or mineral deed, are words of mere surplusage. They
have no effect as to conveying such 'other minerals' as coal, lead or zinc,
because their meaning is confined, under the rule of ejusdem generis, to
minerals of like character . . . The decisions are uniform in restricting the
purpose or intention of an instrument to the subject contemplated in the
grant, not enlarging the scope thereof to include other products more properly classified as metallic substances." Glassmire, Law of Oil and Gas Leases
and Royalties (2 ed. 1938) 295, § 80; annotations In (1922) 17 A.L.R. 156 and
the annotations to Waring v. Foden, 1 Ch. 276 (1932) in (1933) 86 A.L.R.
969, 984; 36 Am. Jur. 283; 40 C.J. 738.
7. United States v. Aitken, 25 Philippine 7, 14 (1921).
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problem completely by determining whether or not the parties
intended to include gravel within the term "mineral."8

By the application of the intention of the parties test in settling
such a controversy the court continues to act consistently in treat-ing problems of this sort, as such was the approach in the foundation case of Vincent v. Bullockg where the issue was as to
exactly what was sold under the term royalty. This approach is
justified by the articles of the Revised Civil Code dealing with
the interpretation of contracts. 10 The court impliedly refused to
apply the doctrine of ejusdem generis" advanced, but the exact
2
result was reached by the use of the intention theory. It is significant to note that the court did not follow the approach used
in the cases involving the question as to whether or not the lessor
of a mineral lease was entitled to the product obtained known as
casing-head gas when the contract did not expressly include it.'
The court's decision in such cases was influenced to a marked
8. Glassmire, op. cit. supra note 6, at 295, § 80. Praeletorian Diamond Oil
Ass'n v. Garvey, 15 S.W. (2d) 698 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) followed in Shell
Petroleum Corporation v. Liberty Gravel and Sand Co., Inc. 128 S.W. (2d)
471 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Gulf Production Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 132
S.W. (2d) 553 (1939); Puget Mill Co. v. Duecy, 1 Wash. (2d) 421, 96 P. (2d)
571 (1939).
9. 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939).
10. Arts. 1945, 1950, 1956, La. Civil Code of 1870. See also Workman v.
Insurance Co., 2 La. 507, 22 Am. Dec. 141 (1831); McKie v. New Orleans, J.
& G.N.R. Co., 16 La. Ann. 79 (1861); Linehan Ry. Transfer Co. v. New Orleans
& N.W.R. Co., 107 La. 645, 31 So. 1026 (1902); Losecco v. Gregory, 108 La.
648, 32 So. 985 (1901); Pratt v. McCoy, 128 La. 570, 54 So. 1012 (1911); Salles
v. Stafford, Derbes & Roy, Inc., 173 La. 361, 137 So. 62 (1931); Boisseau v.
Vallon & Jordand, 174 La. 492, 141 So. 38 (1932); Union Tank Car Co. v.
Louisiana Oil Ref. Corp., 184 La. 121, 165 So. 638 (1936); Vincent v. Bullock,
192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939). This procedure is definitely not authorized under
the common law concept of the parol evidence rule since direct statements
of intention as to what one means by the use of certain words are inadmissible although any and every other circumstance may be considered for
the purpose of ascertaining the actual sense of terms. Wigmore, Code of
Evidence (2 ed. 1935) Rule 231, Art. 1.
11. The maxim ejusdem generis, by which general words following the
enumeration of a particular class of persons or things will be construed as
applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or class as
those enumerated, is only an illustration of the broader maxim, noscitur ex
sociis ("it is known by its associates") and, where applicable, does not require
that the general terms be entirely rejected. See State v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 196 Ala. 570, 72 So. 99 (1916). Cf. Misch v. Russell, 136 I1.
22, 26 N.E. 528 (1891).
12. The rule of interpretation exemplified by the doctrine of ejusdem
generis finds expression in Art. 1961, La. Civil Code of 1870. This doctrine
was accepted in the case of Huie Hodge Lbr. Co. v. Railroad Lands Co., 151
La. 198, 200, 91 So. 676, 677 (1922) which dealt with the interpretation of a
contract reserving "the exclusive right to the iron, coal, and other minerals."
13. Wemple v. Producer's Oil Co., 145 La. 1031, 83 So. 232 (1919); Coyle
v. Louisiana Gas & Fuel Co., 175 La. 990, 144 So. 737 (1932). See also Gilbreath v. States Oil Corp., 4 F. (2d) 232 (C.C.A. 5th, 1925).
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degree by the expense involved in the production of this incidental commodity.
Although the court was not required to pass upon the abstract
question as to whether or not gravel was a mineral, such question
raises extremely interesting problems." If the view should be
taken that the word "minerals" per se was an all inclusive term
under Louisiana's non-ownership theory, oil and gas rights could
be prolonged ad infinitum by the interruption of prescription with
merely the production of gravel or sand. The courts of Louisiana
have so carefully and adequately safeguarded the ten year prescriptive maximum for tying up such valuable rights as oil and
gas under the well established land policy of the state that it
would be a tragedy for an avenue of escape to be now provided
whereby indefinite prolongation of this prescriptive limitation
could be secured by the mere production of sand and gravel, without even a bona fide attempt to search for oil and gas."5
The instant case, nevertheless, should suggest to conveyancers that they specifically include gravel in their contracts if
they expect to be certain of obtaining such material, as the intention test leaves so much room for doubt.
G.R.J.

MINERAL RIGHTS-OBSTACLE TO EXERCISE OF SERVITUDE-ACCRETION-REVERSIONARY INTEREST-Between October 13, 1924, and

April 8, 1925, E. C. White, the owner of a certain tract of land
comprising forty acres, sold all the mineral rights thereunder to
various persons. On April 8, 1925, after recordation of the above
sales, E. C. White, with full warranty of title, sold one-eighth of
the mineral rights of the same tract of land to O'Brien Brothers,
14. Which department of the state would be empowered to grant a gravel

lease-the Conservation Department (falling under the classification of natural resources) by La. Act 47 of 1940, § 1 of XXI [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1942) §
7789], or the Department of Minerals (treating gravel as a mineral), La. Act
47 of 1940, tit. XXII, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1941) § 7788]. According to an

opinion from the Attorney General's office, introduced into evidence in the
instant case, the Department of Minerals has no power to authorize gravel
leases on property owned by the state.
15. The "paying quantities" test as employed in mineral leases is clearly
inapplicable to determine the problem of user as to mineral servitudes. See
Green v. Standard Oil Co. of La., 146 La. 935, 84 So. 211 (1920); Hunter v.
Booker, 158 La. 690, 104 So. 618 (1925); Caldwell v. Alton Oil Co., 161 La. 139,
108 So. 314 (1926); Smith v. Sun Oil Co., 172 La. 655, 135 So. 15 (1931); Pace
Lake Gas Co. v. United Carbon Co., 177 La. 529, 148 So. 699 (1933); Producers
Oil & Gas Co. v. Continental Securities Corp., 188 La. 564, 177 So. 668 (1937);
Logan v. Tholl Oil Co., 189 La. 645, 180 So. 473 (1938). See Daggett, Mineral
Rights in Louisiana (1941) 102, § 30.

